We build a general equilibrium model of investment and capital accumulation in emerging economies. The infinite horizon model features a financial friction, namely that entrepreneurs can only raise debt that they can credibly repay given an outside option such as an investment in the traditional sector of the emerging economy. We show that when lending rates are low, the pure market outcome can be improved upon by a rational asset bubble that relaxes entrepreneurs' borrowing constraints and increases investment in physical capital. The forward looking nature of the no-default constraint establishes a link between the emergence of a bubble and current credit limits as well as the structure of capital advancement. A key role in spreading the bubble is played by the domestic banking sector that channels funds from investors to entrepreneurs. In bubble-like episodes, domestic investors hold less reserves as a fraction of total assets but are compensated by banks with higher rates of return on their investments in the booming domestic capital market. Loans financed by these deposits are channeled to firms, feeding a bubble, i.e. overvaluation of firms, which in turn validates the banks relaxed lending policy that drives an investment boom.
Introduction
Emerging market economies (EM's) have high economic growth outlooks, but face financial frictions that impede investment and development. At the same time, EM's face episodes of bubble-like events, i.e. stock prices above fundamentals, high investment, high growth and rapid development. We argue that financial frictions facilitate the emergence of rational asset bubbles because asset bubbles help to relax firms' borrowing constraints and therefore lead to higher investment. Furthermore, we offer an explanation why bubble-like episodes in EM's are associated with lower international reserve holdings (as a fraction of total assets). We do not claim that investor behavior in EM's in the 1990s was fully rational. However, such explanations may not be necessary because firm valuation and the movement of other macroeconomic price and quantity variables are consistent with a general equilibrium model of rational investment, savings, and asset bubbles.
This paper studies investment, reserve holdings as well as interest rates and returns in EM's in the presence of financing constraints. We first develop a simple setup without bubbles that embeds a financial intermediary (called "bank" subsequently) in an otherwise rather standard general equilibrium model of saving and investment. Banks perform one activity on each side of the balance sheet. They make loans to firms (entrepreneurs) and provide households (investors) with bank deposits as investment vehicles. Thereby they channel savings from domestic investors to entrepreneurs. Furthermore, banks provide investors insurance against shocks by allowing them to hold international reserves.
Entrepreneurs face endogenous borrowing constraints because they face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced, i.e. entrepreneurs can default. The key to understanding the potential role of a bubble is the nature of the credit constraint: the value of the firm restricts current access to capital (credit), but is itself determined by future access to credit. A bubble has the potential to relax borrowing constraints. A credit contract with a bank gives the firm a certain (equity) value. This value is precisely what holds the firm from defaulting on its debt. Incentives to default decrease with the value of the firm even if this value is above its fundamental value. This can be understood by considering an important dynamic consistency feature of borrowing constraints from a bank's perspective: the value of the firm restricts current lending and thus limits capital advancement. An exogenous increase in the value of the firm (not backed by fundamentals) holds the firm from defaulting and is therefore consistent with higher current credit. This additional credit leads to higher capital advancement and increases the future profits of the firm which in turn increases its value today, validating the relaxation of the bank's lending policy due to the initial bubbly increase in the firm value. The forward looking nature of the no-default constraint establishes a link between the emergence of a bubble and current debt limits as well as the structure of capital advancement.
The reasoning so far is partial equilibrium in nature. It does not take into consideration that investors have to be willing to hold bubbles and that the emergence of bubbles feeds back on equilibrium prices. In particular, bubbles tend to crowd out the supply of funds that is held in capital which in turn will drive up rates of return and therefore increase firms' financing costs. Higher financing costs negatively affect the value of the firm, tightening borrowing constraints. We show that general-equilibrium interactions do not necessarily overturn the previous partial-equilibrium logic. Once again, the banking sector is at the heart of our explanation.
Given that both banks and entrepreneurs would be willing to rationally create a bubble the question is what the role of investors in bubbly episodes is. Starting in a situation without bubble, investors hold diversified portfolios provided by banks. They hold interest-bearing domestic deposits as well as international reserves such as liquid but low-yielding US government bonds. Reserves provide investors insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. These shocks determine the investors' holdings of international reserves as well as their domestic asset holdings, i.e. the investors' supply of funds invested in the domestic EM. Only domestic deposits can be lent to entrepreneurs whereas international reserves are unproductive but have an insurance role. The tradeoff investors face is simple: a higher fraction of assets held in international reserves provides better insurance against shocks but lower interest payments. In bubbly episodes, lending rates increase and the bank passes a fraction of the higher lending rate through to investors, increasing deposit rates. This leads to portfolio rebalancing due to the increased opportunity cost of holding reserves. Investors hold portfolios with less international reserves and more domestic deposits.
In a nutshell, the emergence of asset bubbles increases investment by relaxing firms' borrowing constraints and drives domestic lending rates up. Banks partially pass higher lending rates through to investors, thereby inducing portfolio rebalancing. Domestic investors reduce international reserve holdings and invest more on the domestic asset market. The higher exposure to shocks is compensated by higher domestic deposit rates. If investors' willingness to substitute international reserves for domestic deposits is sufficiently high, then increased rates of return in bubbly episodes are consistent with rational credit and investment booms.
In an extension of the basic model, we contribute to a discussion on the inherent fragility of bubbles. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) point out that bubbles may be beneficial because they lead to higher investment. But they stress that bubbles come at a cost because they expose countries to bubblecrashes. They show that decentralized decision making in a bubbly economy leads to overexposure to large crashes. We draw a different picture of bubblecrashes. We link crashes to financial development. Bubbles are substitutes for financial development, i.e. emerge in situations with contract enforcement problems. When financial frictions disappear, bubbles crash but economic development never falls below the (counterfactual) growth path on which a bubble never emerged. This paper is related to a strand of literature on bubbles in OLG models. The seminal contribution is Tirole (1985) . Bubbles in this literature arise in dynamically inefficient economies, and thus they help resolve an overaccumulation problem. Ventura (2003 Ventura ( , 2004 and Caballero, Farhi, and Hammour (2004) as well as Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2006) develop models that address the major empirical shortcoming of Tirole (1985) , namely the fact that bubbly episodes and investment tend to be positively correlated. The argument that we give in this paper is related to these contributions. In our model, bubbles are efficient because they help resolve an underinvestment problem. Our paper does not rely on the assumption that agents live two periods or have finite lives. Also, we point out the role of the banking sector in EM's for spreading asset bubbles and sustaining bubbles in general equilibrium. We build on existing papers on financing constraints, in particular on Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) , but our analysis is in general equilibrium. This is important since bubbles tend to crowd out capital, driving up rates of return, which in turn makes it difficult to sustain overvaluation as a rational market outcome, see Tirole (1982 Tirole ( , 1985 .
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the main results in an economy with asset bubbles. Section 4 considers the role of financial development in crashes. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are given in an appendix.
The Model
The economy consists of households (called investors), financial intermediaries (called banks), and nonfinancial firms (called entrepreneurs). A feature of the model is the incorporation of a banking sector into an otherwise rather standard infinite horizon general equilibrium model of investment and saving. We first describe the role of banks in the allocation of the investors' portfolios, in particular the supply of funds available for domestic loans. We then describe the demand for loans by entrepreneurs in the presence of financial frictions. We show how the overall demand for credit on the capital market changes with the presence of an asset bubble. Finally, we consider the features of an equilibrium that equates supply and demand on the capital market, with and without an asset bubble.
Banks as providers of demand deposits
We model banks as a financial intermediaries that perform one activity on each side of the balance sheet. They make loans to entrepreneurs and provide investors with bank deposits. Thereby they channel savings from investors to entrepreneurs. Furthermore, they provide investors insurance against idiosyncratic preference shocks. These shocks determine the investors' holdings of international reserves (as insurance against these shocks) as well as their holdings of domestic assets. The latter determine the supply of funds available for investment in the domestic market. These functions of the bank are as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . The banking part of the model we develop is a simplified and slightly modified version of Hagedorn (2007) who generalized and adapted the Diamond and Rajan (2001) setup to a dynamic setting in a monetary economy to study inflation dynamics.
Investors can sign up with a bank. They get a demand deposit as savings vehicle. Assets in the demand deposit are interest bearing. Deposits that are not withdrawn are called domestic deposits. Banks pay the deposit rate R D as interest rate on domestic deposits. Investors are allowed to withdraw international reserves without prior notice from their demand deposits. The return on international reserves is normalized to 0 so that R D is the opportunity cost of holding international reserves. For simplicity we abstract from exchange rate issues. Banks can lend domestic deposits to entrepreneurs whereas international reserves only serve to meet investors' insurance motives.
There is no aggregate uncertainty. Banks can therefore hold exactly the amount of international reserves that investors demand every period. International reserves are interpreted as liquid but low-yielding US government bonds. Banks simply pool the demand for international reserves on the liability side of the balance sheet. Subsequently, we explicitly introduce an insurance motive as a rationale for holding international reserves instead of only investing on the domestic market.
Investors' Portfolios
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical infinitely lived investors of measure one. Investors are risk-neutral and derive utility from consuming domestic and foreign goods. Investors are subject to idiosyncratic preference shocks every period that change their preference for foreign versus domestic consumption. International reserves are held to meet foreign consumption of domestic investors. We assume that foreign consumption can only be satisfied by withdrawing international reserves, i.e., there is a cash-in-advance constraint for expenditures on foreign goods that can only be met by holding international reserves.
2 The tradeoff investors face is simple: a higher fraction of international reserves provides better insurance against preference shocks but lower interest payments.
Formally, consumption in period t, c t , is composed of domestic consumption c have no preference for foreign consumption, namely when θ = θ, are "domestic" consumers, similar to Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) "late" consumers. Investors have a preference for foreign consumption when θ t+1 = θ. The shocks θ t are independently distributed over time. Denote by E t the expectation with respect to information available at time t. Then preferences are given by:
Utility at time t can be written recursively as:
Investors are endowed with w t units of (exogenous) wealth from inelastically supplying one unit of labor in t. Let the wage be given by w t = wZ t , with w > 0, where
t is the growth factor and g > 0 is growth rate of the emerging economy. We assume that β (1 + g) < 1.
For simplicity, we assume that by signing up for a bank deposit, investors receive a reservation utility that corresponds to the autarky utility level where no foreign consumption is possible, c f t = 0 for all t. In that case, investors would spend their wage endowment on domestic goods every period, c t = c d t = w t and utility can be computed as
Denote by A t+1 total assets in t+1. X t + are international (foreign eXchange) reserves withdrawn from the bank deposit after t but before t + 1 to smooth preference shocks. E t [X t + ] = pX t + or short EX is the expected holding of international reserves that we identify with the emerging economy's aggregate holdings of reserves. From an aggregate perspective, investors invest A t+1 units in t of which D t+1 := A t+1 −E t X t + are held as domestic deposits and E t X t + are invested in international reserves. Domestic assets can be lent to entrepreneurs whereas international reserves are unproductive and serve to meet foreign-good consumption preferences of domestic investors, i.e. international reserves only have an insurance role.
The Bank's Problem and the Supply of Domestic Deposits and International Reserve Holdings
The bank offers each investor a contract that specifies the total savings in t, A t+1 , the amount of international reserves the investors can maximally withdraw at t + contingent on the (unobservable) realization of his preference shock, and the deposit rate R D t+1 that is paid on the part of the investment that is not withdrawn between t and t + 1. For simplicity we normalize the return to holding reserves to 0 so that the opportunity cost of holding reserves equals the deposit rate.
The domestic deposit holdings of an investor are thus A t+1 if θ t+1 = θ and A t+1 − X t + if θ t+1 = θ. The participation constraint of investors ensures that they obtain their reservation utility w t every period. This leads to the following participation constraint:
This is a function that determines the deposit rate on bank deposits in any interior solution (A t+1 , X t + ) = 0:
Here, γ = p(1 − θ), denotes the preference for international reserves (which increases in p and decreases in θ). The higher is γ, the higher the compensation in terms of an increase in the deposit rate for a one-percent increase in X/D.
This relationship also determines the cost of the bank to satisfy the investors participation constraint, denoted by P C(X, D). The banks has to hold X international reserves and D = A − EX domestic assets. This costs
The bank also faces costs for providing assets, namely management costs φ X (X, Z) and φ D (D, Z). To ensure an interior steady state solution these costs are assumed to be homogenous of degree 1. Furthermore, they are positive, monotone and strictly convex in X and D. The bank maximizes profits subject to the participation constraint of the investors. If we summarize all costs the bank faces by the total cost function:
Skipping time indices, the necessary and sufficient first-order conditions are:
We can now obtain the supply of domestic deposits that can be lent to entrepreneurs as a function of the lending rate R:
Proposition 1 An increase in the lending rate increases domestic deposits:
The intuition for this result is that an increase in the lending rate potentially increases the bank's interest rate margin. The bank therefore wants to relax its lending policy. It raises the necessary domestic deposits by offering the investors a higher deposit rate, thereby passing through a fraction of the increased lending rate to investors in the form of a higher deposit rate.
An important result to which we will refer later when the effects of the emergence of a bubble are analyzed refers to the composition of the investors' portfolio when the lending rate increases.
Proposition 2 An increase in the lending rate shifts investors' portfolios from international reserves to domestic assets:
Note that this portfolio rebalancing is not without costs for the investor since his insurance against preference shocks is lowered. However, the investor is compensated for this shift by an increase in the rate of return on his bank deposit, i.e., a fraction of the higher lending rate is passed through from banks to investors:
We summarize the effect of a higher lending rate on domestic deposits by the increasing function D(R).
We now specify the banks cost functions, namely we assume that φ
e. quadratic costs with marginal cost parameter φ > 0 and
We make the following assumption throughout the paper:
Assumption 3 The marginal costs of intermediation in the banking sector (represented by the cost parameter φ) are sufficiently low, i.e. φ is close to but larger than 0.
In summary, we have so far developed the supply of funds side of the economy. The analysis was partial equilibrium because we took interest rates as given. The result was an increasing domestic-supply-of-assets schedule D(R). Finally, we showed that an (exogenous) increase in the lending rate endogenously increases the deposit rate (as an optimal reaction of the bank) and thereby leads to a portfolio rebalancing effect of investors away from international reserves towards a higher fraction of domestic asset holdings. We now turn to the demand for loans by entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs' Demand for Loans in the Presence of Financial Frictions
The demand for loans comes from firms owned by entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs live for two periods and maximize the present value of their consumption. 4 Their only possible source of income is to start a project in their first period of life that generates profits in their second period of life. Consider a representative entrepreneur in period t. To carry out a project, he requires working capital K t+1 invested in period t and effective in t + 1. This working capital is financed by borrowing from banks at the prevailing interest rate R t+1 . The return of project is given by strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable production function F (K, Z). The production function has constant returns to scale with F (0, Z) = 0 and lim The discounted gross profit of the entrepreneur in period t is thus given by:
Denote the capital stock at which profits are maximized (first best) by
. Then the entrepreneur would like to carry out the project at full scale, i.e., invest capital K f b t+1 . He has no wealth and therefore wants to raise debt. However, the entrepreneur is credit constrained. The reason for this is that he has an alternative outside option with value O(K t+1 , Z t+1 ). This could, e.g., be an investment in the traditional sector of the EM. Literally interpreted, when the entrepreneur receives a loan of K from a bank to finance his working capital, he could simply run away with the working capital, which would give him a payoff of O (K, Z), instead of investing the loan in the firm, which would produce profits of Π (K, R, Z). Thus, at a lending rate of R, the entrepreneur will only receive an amount of capital K from the bank that satisfies his incentive constraint that ensures that debt repayments are self-enforcing:
Throughout the paper, we assume:
We assume that the function O specifying the entrepreneur's outside option satisfies:
Further, O is homogenous of degree 1.
To simplify the notation we now switch to growth adjusted (detrended) variables or, loosely speaking, to per capita variables. In the following, we will consider everything in per capita values. Define k t+1 := 
For any given R t+1 there exists exactly one positive k t+1 such that
. We assume throughout the paper that credit constraint is binding every period, i.e. the capital stock k t+1 = k t+1 (R t+1 ) that follows from the previous equality is lower than the first best capital stock at which the marginal product of capital equals the lending rate. Therefore, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to choose k t+1 (R t+1 ), which gives the highest profit from all incentive compatible capital stocks. The (growth adjusted) value of the firm discounted back to period t is then given by:
Note that due to the binding borrowing constraint, the capital stock is lower than the first best capital stock. Therefore the marginal product of capital is higher than in a frictionless economy where it would equal the lending rate.
Equilibrium in an Economy without Bubbles
Suppose we start the economy, so to speak, at date t = −1. An equilibrium in period -1 requires market clearing on the loan loan market, i.e. the demand for loans equals the supply of domestic deposits. In detrended terms, this translates to:
Suppose we start in a (bubbleless) equilibrium with a binding borrowing constraint and denote the initial capital stock by k 0 . Let the lending rate be R 0 and denote the firm value by π −1 . Since we have not yet introduced a bubble, π −1 equals the fundamental value of the firm. We make the following assumption throughout the paper [see Ventura (2003) and Caballero, Farhi, Hammour (2006) for a similar assumption and the discussions therein]:
Assumption 5 We assume that the EM's growth rate 1 + g is higher than the financing costs of firms R 0 in the economy without bubbles.
Since the marginal product of capital is higher than the lending rate, we are not in a dynamically inefficient world as in Tirole (1985) . 5 We now turn to the possibility that an asset bubble emerges in our EM economy.
Asset Bubbles in Emerging Markets
In this section, we ask whether an overpriced asset like an asset bubble can emerge in general equilibrium and how it interacts with variables of interest in the economy. We first turn the demand for loans that now must potentially cover the costs of capital investment as well as investments in bubbly firms/projects.
The demand for loans in a bubbly economy
Consider the dynamics of a sufficiently small bubble b > 0, that emerges in period 0 for the first time. 6 Without loss of generality the bubble b is specified 5 The net-dividend-criterion of Abel et al. (1989) is also satisfied, as can easily be seen. Therefore, dynamic inefficiency is not an issue here. 6 The emerging bubble cannot be arbitrarily large. Otherwise it would outgrow the economy and therefore not be feasible. Tirole (1985) in fact shows that there is a maximum feasible bubble in his model. We conjecture that such a result carries over to our setup. In any case, our analysis holds for a sufficiently small bubble.
in detrended values. It increases the value of the firm above its fundamental value (see above) and therefore affects the entrepreneur's self-enforcing debt constraint:
Suppose that in each of the following periods, a detrended bubble of the same size b > 0 emerges. We introduce two more variables that describe how a potential bubble spreads through the economy. First, B t denotes the size of the aggregate bubble in period t. Second, denote by B t the size of the aggregate bubble detrended by the growth rate of the economy B t := Bt (1+g) t . Formally, these variables are then defined by the law of motion: B t := bZ t +R t−1 B t−1 , with B 0 = 0. The key variable is B t because as the economy grows, a bubble in order to be feasible in a rational expectations setup can never outgrow the economy. Otherwise -by backward induction -nobody would be willing to hold at the beginning when it potentially emerges. The decisive step in the subsequent analysis is to show how the size of a bubble as a fraction of the output grows over time -following the law of motion -with interest rates adjusting endogenously in the presence of the bubble. This parallels the analysis in Tirole (1985) . However, in his frictionless model bubbles can only exist if the (bubbleless) economy overaccumulates capital. As Abel et al. (1989) have shown, this is not an empirically relevant scenario. Our analysis starts from the premise that financial frictions lead to an underaccumulation problem.
Consider now the credit constraint in period t after in each previous period -starting in period t = 0 -a new bubble of detrended constant size b emerges. In period t we have additional investment cost, R t B t−1 . On the other hand, if the existing aggregate bubble R t B t−1 does not burst, it appears also as part of the value of the firm and thus drops out. Formally,
and thus remains unaffected compared to the initial date t = 0. This property simplifies the dynamics considerably and is a main reason why we focus on stationary bubbles b. Note that the dynamics are non-stationary because of the dynamics of the aggregate bubble. We denote the solution K t+1 of (11) by
for some function k. Therefore, with a slight abuse of notation, we can write k (R t+1 , 0) = k(R t+1 ). Rewriting equation (11) in detrended terms, we obtain
and we have k (R t+1 , b) as the detrended demand for capital by entrepreneurs.
Equilibrium on the Loan Market
An equilibrium on the domestic capital market is given by
Here, B t is given by bZ t + R t−1 bZ t−1 + R t−1 R t−2 bZ t−2 + ... + R t−1 ...R 1 bZ 1 . Writing the market clearing condition in detrended terms thus yields:
In the following, we again consider everything in detrended terms. To simplify notation we define r t+1 :=
Rt+1
1+g as the growth adjusted lending rate. Define with a slight abuse of notation k(r t+1 , b) := k(r t+1 (1 + g), b) and d (r t+1 ) := d (r t+1 (1 + g)). The right hand side of these two definitions is the meaning of the functions k and d up to this point.
Entrepreneurs expect there to be a bubble b in the next period when production takes place. This relaxes their borrowing constraint and therefore leads to a higher demand for capital. What complicates the equilibrium analysis is that if a bubble existed in the previous period, then this old aggregate bubble r t B t is also traded in the market. The demand for loans (capital and old aggregate bubble) in period t is thus: k (R t+1 , b) + r t B t with k r < 0 and k b > 0. The supply of capital through investors' domestic asset holdings is: d (r t+1 ) with d (r t+1 ) > 0.
Recall that the equilibrium without bubble (period t=-1) requires market clearing, which reads as: k (r 0 , 0) = d (r 0 ) in the notation that allows for a bubble. In every period after the bubble emerges, the equilibrium lending rate r t+1 is determined by equating loan demand (comprising capital and the bubble) and the supply of funds on the loan market. In period t ≥ 0 after the first bubble has emerged in period 0, market clearing requires:
with B 0 = 0. Note that B 1 = b is the initial bubble that emerged in t = 1. If period 1 is the first period in which a bubble b emerges, then we get a sequence of equilibrium lending rates r (0) = r 0 , r 1 , ..., r t , .... We obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 The lending rate in an equilibrium with bubble b converges monotonically from the bubbleless lending rate r 0 to a maximum market clearing lending rate r (b) given implicitly by:
To see whether the bubble b allows for a permanently higher physical capital stock, we have to check whether k (r (b) , b) > k (r(0), 0), where r(0) = r 0 is the lending rate in the initial, bubbleless equilibrium.
Proposition 7 An asset bubble induces an investment boom:
In the transition from an equilibrium without bubble to a steady state with bubble, lending rates increase, investment rises, and international reserves as a fraction of total assets fall. Furthermore, firm and bank profits rise. The long-run detrended aggregate consumption increases, i.e. c (b
Financial Development, Bubbles and Crashes
In this section, we turn to the analysis of the inherent fragility of bubbles. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) stress that bubbles may be beneficial but that they come at a cost because they expose countries to bubble-crashes. They show that decentralized decision making in a bubbly economy leads to overexposure to large crashes. We draw a different picture of bubble-crashes in this section. We link crashes to financial development. Bubbles are substitutes for financial development, i.e. emerge in situations with contract enforcement problems. They are catalysts in the process of economic development. When emerging market economies become more financially developed, bubbles crash and capital stock and output drop. However, the process of bubble-driven capital advancement with a crash dominates economic development without bubbles and crashes. Bubbles may be fragile but they speed up capital advancement as long as financial frictions are binding. When financial frictions disappear, bubbles crash but economic development never falls below the growth path where a bubble never emerged.
To incorporate this extension, we make two changes in the model of the previous section. Note that in this section all variables and equations are in detrended form. First, we assume that depreciation is less than 1. This allows for dynamic effects of bubbles that were not present before. The dynamic effect of a bubble that emerges in period t is that it has a potential effect on the period t+1 investment decision. One way to make this channel effective is that the value of the outside option does no longer depend on the whole capital stock (depreciated capital and new investment), but only on the newly invested capital. The second change is that after some time T, with probability q there will be what we define as "financial development", namely that financing constraints gradually disappear. This means that the value of the outside option, specified as
goes to zero with a some probability, where i denotes new investment. Formally, if in period T the event "financial development" occurs, λ t+T ↓ 0 for t ≥ 0 with λ T = λ. If the event "Financial development" does not occur, λ remains fixed at its previous level λ. We assume that the entrepreneurs in period T − 1 are risk neutral. We will show that a bubble b that emerges in period 0 will have the effect that from periods 0 to T, capital accumulation is speeded up in comparison to a situation without a bubble. This is intuitive from the results in the previous section. In the first period of the bubble, this occurs because the bubble relaxes the credit constraint, from period 1 to T this holds because the higher inherited capital stock from previous periods relaxes the credit constraint. What is new is that the bubble bursts in period T if the event "financial development" occurs.
The period t + 1 capital stock is now given by k t+1 = i t + (1 − δ) k t . Here, 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital and i t denotes the new investment in period t. Thus, the production function for period t + 1 is now given by:
The self-enforcing debt constraint now becomes:
This implicitly defines a function i (r t+1 , k t ) and thus a demand for overall capital for period
The supply of capital is as in the previous sections given by d (r t+1 ). We suppose that we start in a steady state that is given by a pair (k * , r * ) such that
The function k() describes the mapping k t+1 = k(r t+1 , k t ). Thus, in a steady state, given the capital stock the previous period was k * and the capital market clearing interest rate is r * , this yields again a capital stock of k * . As in the previous section we assume that in the bubbleless steady state the lending rate is smaller than the growth rate of the economy, or, in detrended terms: r * < 1. Starting now in the steady state, we want to compare two scenarios: in period 0, a bubble b > 0 emerges on the initial project. For simplicity and in contrast to the previous section, we assume that no new bubble emerges for t > 0. This simplifies the analysis but is without loss of generality. Our benchmark scenario is an economy where no bubble emerges.
Benchmark: Bubbleless Equilibrium with Financial Development
The benchmark case without a bubble is easy to describe: until period T, the economy stays at the steady state (r * , k * ). If the event "no financial development" occurs (with probability 1 − q), it will further remain at (r * , k * ). If the event "financial development" occurs, the function o begins to decrease. This will increase increase the capital stock in period T + 1 above k * . This fact and the further decrease of o in period T + 1 will also make k T +2 > k * . By induction, we easily obtain k T +t ≥ k * for all t ≥ 0. Further as λ t+T ↓ 0, the debt 7 Since depreciation is now less than 1, the period t+1 output is equal to e f (it + (1 − δ) kt)+ (1 − δ) (it + (1 − δ) kt) , if we identify e f with the production function of the previous sections. We simply define f (it
constraint will after some time T > T no longer be binding, so that
for t > T . In summary, the benchmark economy stays in the steady state without a bubble if no financial development occurs. This path features underdevelopment, i.e. underaccumulation of capital relative to the first best, since the borrowing constraint is binding. With financial development, the economy converges to the first best.
Bubbles with Financial Development: Capital Advancement and Crashes
If a bubble b > 0 emerges in period 0, the investment for period 1 is determined by
The implicitly defined function
Together with the capital market equilibrium condition i 0 (r 1 , b, k
is the equilibrium value of k 1 in the bubbly equilibrium (the same for other variables) and k 1 (nb) is the equilibrium value of k 1 in the bubbleless equilibrium.
The investment in period 2 of the bubbly equilibrium is determined by
Since by our simplifying assumption no new bubble emerges in period 1, the aggregate bubble r 1 b drops out of the debt constrained. However, in contrast to the previous section, the fact that k 1 (b) enters the debt constraint makes the period 1 investment decision in a bubbly equilibrium different from one in an equilibrium without bubble. With i (r 2 , k 1 (b)) , the capital market clearing condition becomes
From Lemma 11 in the appendix, we know that i (r (14), we must have that r 2 (b) > r * and k 2 (b) < k 1 (b). If the bubble b > 0 is chosen sufficiently small, it follows from the continuity of the implicit functions r 1 (.) and r 2 (.) that r 2 (b) < 1. Further, d (r) is sufficiently elastic under assumption 3 so that k 2 (b) > k * = k 2 (nb), despite the bubble r 1 b. If we continue inductively, we obtain that k t (b) > k * for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Also, it follows that r t (b) < 1 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Now at period T, there will be financial development with probability 1 − q. What happens with the bubble in this case? Since the debt constraint will no longer bind after finitely many periods T ≤ T , the capital stock will be at its first best level k f b after T . By assumption, r f b > 1, i.e. the first best capital stock does feature capital overaccumulation. Therefore, the aggregate bubble in the economy T periods after emergence of the bubble, would explode [see Tirole (1985) ]. This is however inconsistent with a rational expectations equilibrium. Therefore, in the case of the event "financial development" the bubble must burst immediately.
Thus, compared to the economy without a bubble, in the case of "financial development", from period T onwards both economies are the same except that the bubbly economy starts with k T (b) > k * , which is the starting value for the non-bubbly economy. This immediately implies that k T +t (b, f ) ≥ k T +t (nb, f ).
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If the event "no financial development" occurs at T, the bubble will jump to a value of
. This follows since entrepreneurs in T − 1 are risk neutral and the bubble bursts in the event "financial development", which occurs with probability q. So in the "no financial development" case, the capital market clearing condition in period T becomes:
Again, under the same assumptions as in the previous section, we obtain that
) for all t ≥ 1. Also, for b sufficiently small r T +t (b, nf ) < 1 for all t ≥ 1, so that the aggregate bubble vanishes asymptotically in the case of "no financial development". In summary, we have shown that the physical capital stock with bubble (with or without a crash) is higher in each date event than the physical capital stock in the bubbleless equilibrium:
Proposition 8 Suppose we start in a steady state equilibrium without a bubble, (k * , r * ) and that in period T > 1 financial development takes place with probability q, so that the self-enforcing debt constraint becomes non-binding.
Then the capital stock in the bubbly equilibrium with a (sufficiently small) initial bubble b > 0 dominates the capital stock in the bubbleless equilibrium, both before and after financial development takes place, i.e. with or without a crash. Formally: k t (b) > k t (nb) = k * for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T, and we also have
* for all t ≥ T + 1. Furthermore, the capital stock with and without bubble converges to the first best capital stock:
in a finite number of periods.
Concluding Remarks
This paper adds to the new literature on rational asset bubbles in a world with financial frictions. Financial underdevelopment in the form of financing constraints for firms that cannot credibly repay debt is a prerequisite for the emergence of asset bubbles. A main contribution of this paper is to point out the important role of banks in the process of bubbly investment booms. Bubbles are catalysts in the process of development. We show that crashes are an unavoidable consequence of financial development. However, this does not imply that bubbles are bad. In comparison to a path of development without bubbles the path with a bubble-crash still dominates in terms of output and growth.
Several extensions are possible. In work in progress we consider the role of monetary policy in bubbly episodes, in particular the effects of stringent capital requirements as well as the possibility of a soft landing instead of a crash. Also, the model could be extended to analyze the role of aggregate uncertainty on the likelihood of crashes.
For the second derivatives, we obtain
This gives the properties of P C stated above. Using the homogeneity properties of the cost function, we have
Here, d and x are the solutions of the bank's problem for Z = 1.
The necessary and sufficient first-order conditions are:
Note that since P C (X, D) , φ D and φ X is homogenous of degree 1, the partial derivatives of these functions are homogenous of degree 0. This implies given that Z grows with 1+g, for the same R, the optimal values X and D also grow by the factor 1 + g. To obtain the supply of funds that are lent to entrepreneurs as a function of the lending rate R we calculate with the implicit function theorem:
This proves Proposition 1.
We obtain for international reserve holdings:
Combining these result with the quotient rule for differentiation, and using the fact that homogeneity of degree 0 of P C X implies that P C XX X +P C XD D = 0,it follows that:
This proves Proposition 2. In this case, an increase in the lending rate R increases both international reserves and domestic investment, X and D, and thus overall investment A. In any case, domestic investment rises and the investor portfolio composition shifts from international reserves to domestic investments. The investor is compensated for this shift by an increase in the rate of return on his bank deposit, i.e., a fraction of the higher lending rate is passed through from banks to investors.
Proof of Proposition 6
Note that for any r t < 1, we have
Consider the following implicit function r (b) with the bubbleless lending rate r (0) = r 0 :
where r (b) is given by the implicit function theorem with
which is positive at (r(0), 0) , i.e. Lemma 9 For a sufficiently small bubble b, the lending rate in every period t is bounded by r 0 < r t < r (b) < 1 for any t ≥ 1 and increasing: r t < r t+1 for any t ≥ 1.
Proof. We show inductively that r 0 < r t < r (b) < 1 for any t ≥ 1 and r t+1 > r t for a sufficiently small b. r (b) < 1 for a sufficiently small b follows from the implicit function theorem. The statement is true for r 1 : k (r 1 , b) = d (r 1 ) implies, given the derivatives of k and d immediately that r 0 < r 1 . The fact that k (r (b) , b) > d (r (b)) and the derivatives of d and k give r 1 < r (b) .Now suppose that the statement is true for this b and for all r s with s ≤ t for some t ≥ 1, i.e. r s < r (b) and r s > r s−1 . We have by definition that k (r t , b) + r t−1 b t−1 = d (r t ) . For t ≥ 1, because R s−1 < R s for s ≤ t and B t−1 = b+R t−2 b+...+R t−2 ...R 1 b < b+R t−1 b+...+R t−1 ...R 1 b = B t we have R t−1 B t−1 < R t B t and thus K (R t , b)+ R t B t > D (R t ) . Consider now the function g ( r) := k ( r, b) + r t B t − d ( r) . We have g (r t ) > 0 and we must have by definition g (r t+1 ) = 0. Consider now the function h ( r) := k ( r, b) + e rb 1−e r − d ( r) . By definition, h (r (b)) = 0. Since rtb 1−rt > r t B t , we have that h (r t ) > g (r t ) > 0. Also, note that for any ξ ∈ (r t , min {1, r t+1 }) we have h (ξ) = k r (ξ, b)
. This implies that given r (b) < 1 we must have a unique r t+1 < r (b) . We also have r t+1 > r t given that the derivative of g is negative. This finishes the induction.
Since the sequence R t is increasing and bounded by R (b) , it must converge to some limit R. We show:
Lemma 10 The lending rate converges to the maximum market clearing rate: r t → r(b).
Proof. Suppose r < r (b) . Note that as r t → r, we have that r t B t → rb 1−r . Thus we have k (r, b)
On the other hand, the implicit function theorem guarantees a unique solution of (21) for b sufficiently small. Thus we have a contradiction and it follows that r = r (b).
Altogether, the proposition is proved.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof From Lemma 9 the interest rate rises on the transition path. Then from Propositions 1 and 2, lending increases and the fraction of international reserves to domestic assets decreases. Simple porperties of the profit functions of firms and banks imply that their profit rises if lending rates rise. That investment in the transition rises follows from the fact that the aggregate bubble in the transition phase is smaller than 
